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Abstract
In this paper we extend some recent results on an operatorial approach to the description of alliances
between political parties interacting among themselves and with a basin of electors. In particular, we
propose and compare three different models, deducing the dynamics of their related decision functions, i.e.
the attitude of each party to form or not an alliance. In the first model the interactions between each party
and their electors are considered. We show that these interactions drive the decision functions towards
certain asymptotic values depending on the electors only: this is the perfect party, which behaves following
the electors’ suggestions. The second model is an extension of the first one in which we include a rule which
modifies the status of the electors, and of the decision functions as a consequence, at some specific time
step. In the third model we neglect the interactions with the electors while we consider cubic and quartic
interactions between the parties and we show that we get (slightly oscillating) asymptotic values for the
decision functions, close to their initial values. This is the real party, which does not listen to the electors.
Several explicit situations are considered in details and numerical results are also shown.
Keywords: Quantum models in macroscopic systems; Decision making; Dynamical systems.
1 Introduction
Mathematical modeling is a huge field of research which is applied to many different contexts, from physics to
biology, from chemistry to finance. Tools and ideas usually adopted in physics have widely been used in these
contexts. Pars pro toto, we cite [25], which is now considered a milestone in econophysics, [13, 14, 31], where the
framework of statistical physics is used outside physics, and [27, 28] as application of stochastic dynamics to social
systems. Among all the strategies adopted during the years to build up models of some specific phenomenon, in
recent years many researchers started to use methods typically connected with quantum mechanics, even when
dealing with macroscopic systems. This has been done in decision-making processes, [22, 21, 12, 1, 2, 3], in
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population dynamics, [6, 20], in ecological processes, [4, 9, 15], and, recently, in the analysis of political systems,
[23, 24, 5, 7, 8]. In these latter papers, the general operatorial settings analyzed in details in [3] have been used
in the description of a political system consisting of three parties interacting among them and with a basin of
electors and of undecided voters. The focus was on the so-called decision function (DF) of each party, i.e. on the
attitude of the parties to form, or not, some alliance with the other parties. The main ingredient needed in the
analysis of the time evolution of these DFs is a suitable Hamiltonian (i.e. a self-adjoint unbounded operator)
which implements in itself all the mechanisms which are expected to take place in a realistic (but simplified)
political system in which each party is treated as a single variable of the model. This is different from what
was proposed in other mathematical models on the same subject, where the focus was on the single politician’s
behavior, see [16] and [11].
In this paper the crucial role in the procedure of decision-making of the parties is played by the various
interactions existing between the parties and the basin of electors, which we treat as a kind of open system (the
parties) interacting with a reservoir made of infinite degrees of freedom (the electors). This approach gives rise
to several scenarios which are investigated all along the paper.
We also consider the possibility of implementing some effect which cannot be easily included in the Hamil-
tonian H of the system. In particular we adopt a general procedure proposed first in [10], where the notion of
(H, ρ)-induced dynamics was introduced. In particular, in [10], a rule ρ was added to H in the analysis of the
quantum game of life: ρ is what is used to define the new state of the system at each iteration, because, for
instance, the idea of the electors could be changed by what the parties are doing. Stated in different words, ρ
is used to prepare the physical system for the iteration k + 1 once the iteration k is performed. This enriches
quite a lot the dynamics, and in fact several interesting results are deduced. In particular, we will discuss how
a suitable rule, introduced to mimic the effect of the information coming from the electors and reaching the
parties, can really deform the dynamics.
We will finally consider also the effect of nonlinear terms in the equations of motion. Something similar was
done in [7], where the equations of motion were solved perturbatively, while here, paying the price of neglecting
the interactions of the parties with their electors (i.e. taking the parameters measuring these interactions to be
zero) and focusing only on the interactions among the parties, we are able to get analytical solutions.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we briefly discuss the model in [8], and we discuss
what this model produces when the parameters are changed. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of a deformed
version of the previous model, deformation induced by the presence of a rule ρ. In Section 5 we propose
a non quadratic Hamiltonian producing nonlinear, but still exactly solvable, equations of motion. Section 5
contains our conclusions. To keep the paper self-consistent, the Appendix contains some essential facts on the
(H, ρ)-induced dynamics.
2 The first model
In this section, following [5, 8], we consider a physical system S consisting, first of all, of three parties, P1, P2 and
P3, which, together, form what we call SP . Each party has to make a choice, and it can only choose one or zero,
corresponding respectively to form a coalition with some other party or not. Hence we have 23 = 8 different
possibilities, which we associate to eight different and mutually orthogonal vectors in an eight-dimensional
Hilbert space HP . These vectors are called ϕi,k,l, with i, k, l = 0, 1. The three subscripts refer to whether or
2
not the three parties of the model want to form a coalition at time t = 0. Hence, for example, the vector ϕ0,0,0,
describes the fact that, at t = 0, no party wants to ally with the other parties. Of course, this attitude can
change during the time evolution, and deducing these changes is, in fact, what is interesting for us. This will be
achieved, see below, by considering the mean values of some particular operators on these vectors or on some
of their linear combinations. The set Fϕ = {ϕi,k,l, i, k, l = 0, 1} is an orthonormal basis for HP . In general,
a vector Ψ0 =
∑
i,k,l αi,k,lϕi,k,l, with
∑
i,k,l |αi,k,l|2 = 1, can be interpreted as a vector on SP in which the
probability of finding SP in a state ϕi,k,l, at t = 0, is given by |αi,k,l|2. In particular, if for instance Ψ0 = ϕ0,1,0,
then the probability that, at t = 0, P1 and P3 do not want to form any alliance while P2 does, is equal to one.
As it is shown in [5], it is convenient to construct the vectors ϕi,k,l in a very special way, starting with the
vacuum of three fermionic operators, p1, p2 and p3, i.e. three operators which, together with their adjoints p
†
1,
p†2 and p
†
3, satisfy the canonical anticommutation relations (CAR) {pk, p†l } = δk,l and {pk, pl} = 0. Then, ϕ0,0,0
is a vector satisfying pjϕ0,0,0 = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, and the other vectors ϕi,k,l can be constructed out of ϕ0,0,0 as
follows:
ϕ1,0,0 = p
†
1ϕ0,0,0, ϕ0,1,0 = p
†
2ϕ0,0,0, ϕ1,1,0 = p
†
1 p
†
2ϕ0,0,0, ϕ1,1,1 = p
†
1 p
†
2 p
†
3ϕ0,0,0,
and so on. Let now Pˆj = p
†
jpj be the so-called number operator of the j-th party. This operator satisfies
Pˆjϕn1,n2,n3 = njϕn1,n2,n3 , for j = 1, 2, 3, and the eigenvalues nj of these operators, zero and one, correspond
to the only possible choices of the three parties at t = 0, at least when the state of the system at t = 0 is one of
the vectors ϕn1,n2,n3 . More in general, if the initial state of the system is given by the vector Ψ0 above, then
Pˆ1Ψ0 =
∑
k,l
α1,k,lϕ1,k,l, Pˆ2Ψ0 =
∑
i,l
αi,1,lϕi,1,l, Pˆ3Ψ0 =
∑
i,k
αi,k,1ϕi,k,1,
and the initial mean values
〈
Pˆj
〉
of the operators Pˆj on Ψ0 turn out to be〈
Pˆ1
〉
=
∑
k,l
|α1,k,l|2,
〈
Pˆ2
〉
=
∑
i,l
|αi,1,l|2,
〈
Pˆ3
〉
=
∑
i,k
|αi,k,1|2, (2.1)
which are all real numbers between 0 and 1. This is the main reason why we have used here the fermionic
operators pj : they produce a mean value of the number operators Pˆj which is always (i.e., also during the time
evolution; this will be clear later) between 0 and 1, and according to what was stated in [5]-[8], and to the
definition given later in (2.9), we shall interpret this value as a measure of the attitude of the party Pj to form
an alliance or not, maximum when it is one, and minimal when it is zero.
Following the general scheme described in [3] and adopted in very different contexts, trough the Heisenberg
equation for the operators we are able to give a dynamics to the number operator Pˆj , and, consequently, a
time evolution to the mean values
〈
Pˆj
〉
in (2.1). Of course, these values depend on the values of the αi,k,l at
t = 0. This will be evident in the examples discussed all along this paper. In this way, we can follow how the
parties modify their attitude on forming alliances with time. This is achieved by fixing, first of all, a suitable
Hamiltonian, which describes the interactions indicated by the arrows in Figure 1. Here Rj represents the set
of the supporters of Pj , while Rund is the set of all the undecided electors. The full system S is the union of
SP and R = {R1,R2,R3,Rund}. Figure 1 shows that, as it is reasonable to imagine, each party Pj interacts
with the other parties, with their electors, Rj , with the undecided voters Rund, but also with the electors of the
other parties, Rk, with k 6= j. This possibility, in particular, was not considered in [5] and was first introduced,
3
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Figure 1: The system and its multi-component reservoir.
but not analyzed in details, in [8].
Following what done in [5] and [8], we assume that the Hamiltonian which describes the scheme in Figure
1, written in terms of fermionic operators, is the following:
h = H +Hmix,
Hmix = H
p
mix +H
ap
mix,
Hpmix =
∑3
n 6=l,1 ν
p
nl
∫
R dk
(
pnB
†
l (k) +Bl(k)p
†
n
)
,
Hapmix =
∑3
n 6=l,1 ν
ap
nl
∫
R dk
(
p†nB
†
l (k) +Bl(k)pn
)
,
(2.2)
where 
H = H0 +HPBs +HPB +Hint,
H0 =
∑3
j=1 ωjp
†
jpj +
∑3
j=1
∫
R Ωj(k)B
†
j (k)Bj(k) dk +
∫
R Ω(k)B
†(k)B(k) dk,
HPBs =
∑3
j=1 λj
∫
R
(
pjB
†
j (k) +Bj(k)p
†
j
)
dk,
HPB =
∑3
j=1 λ˜j
∫
R
(
pjB
†(k) +B(k)p†j
)
dk,
Hint = µ
ex
12
(
p†1p2 + p
†
2p1
)
+ µcoop12
(
p†1p
†
2 + p2p1
)
+ µex13
(
p†1p3 + p
†
3p1
)
+
+µcoop13
(
p†1p
†
3 + p3p1
)
+ µex23
(
p†2p3 + p
†
3p2
)
+ µcoop23
(
p†2p
†
3 + p3p2
)
.
(2.3)
Here ωj , λj , λ˜j , µ
ex
ij , µ
coop
ij , ν
p
nl and ν
ap
nl are real quantities, while Ωj(k) = Ωjk and Ω(k) = Ωk are real-valued
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functions, Ωj ,Ω > 0, whose meaning is explained in details in [5]-[8], together with the meaning of each term
of h. Here we just recall that the parameters ωj , Ωj and Ω in H0 are related to a sort of inertia of the actors
of the system, see also [3] for a general discussion on this aspect. The term Hint is an interaction part of the
Hamiltonian, whose parameters µexjk and µ
coop
jk measure respectively the strength of the interactions between
Pj and Pk; we observe that the interaction governed by the term µexkj
(
p†kpj + p
†
jpk
)
introduces some kind of
competition between the parties Pk and Pj , because µexkj p†kpj increases the attitude of Pk to ally whereas the
attitude of Pj decreases, while the hermitian conjugate term1 induces an opposite effect. On the other hand,
in µcoopkj
(
p†kp
†
j + pjpk
)
, the two parties act in a similar way: they both increase, or decrease, their tendency to
form some alliance. The term HPBs describes the interactions between the parties and their electors, whereas
HPB describes the interactions between the parties and the undecided electors: both these contributions model
the fact that the value of the DFs are somehow driven to the input of the electors, in a rather direct way. It
is important to stress that, as it is clear from (2.2) and (2.3), the three parties are considered here as a part
of a larger system: in order to take their decisions, the parties need to interact with the electors and among
themselves, since it is exactly this interaction which motivates their final decisions. This is why SP must be
open, i.e. there must be some environment, R (the full set of electors), interacting with P1, P2 and P3, which
produces some feedback used by Pj to decide what to do. Moreover, the environment, when compared with SP ,
is expected to be very large, since the sets of the electors for P1, P2 and P3 are supposed to be sufficiently large.
This is the reason why (infinitely many) operators Bj(k) and B
†
j (k), k ∈ R, appear in (2.2) and (2.3). It can be
useful to observe that h is quadratic. This is physically meaningful and technically useful, since the differential
equations we deduce out of h can be solved analytically. We refer to [3] for examples, mainly in finance, where
only perturbative approaches can be adopted to solve differential equations arising from, say, cubic or quartic
Hamiltonians.
The following CAR’s for the operators of the reservoir are assumed:
{Bj(k), B†l (q)} = δj,lδ(k − q) 1 , {Bj(k), Bl(k)} = 0, (2.4)
as well as
{B(k), B†(q)} = δ(k − q) 1 , {B(k), B(k)} = 0, (2.5)
for all j, l = 1, 2, 3, k, q ∈ R. Moreover each p]j anti-commutes with each B]l (k) and with B](k): {p]j , B]l (k)} =
{p]j , B](k)} = 0 for all j, l and for all k, and we further assume that {B](q), B]l (k)} = 0, for all k, q ∈ R. Here
X] stands for X or X†. Of course, other choices are also possible for these operators. For instance, one could
require that they obey canonical commutation relations, rather than the CAR’s. However, we prefer to restrict
to (2.4) and (2.5) since it reflects, for the electors, the analogous choice adopted for the operators of the parties.
In this way our model is entirely fermionic.
Once h is given, we have to compute the time evolution of the number operators in the Heisenberg scheme
as Pˆj(t) := e
ihtPˆje
−iht, and then their mean values on some suitable state describing the full system S (parties
and electors) at t = 0. This is what has been called decision function (DF) in [5, 7, 8], see also formula
(2.9) below. To find these mean values it is convenient to compute first the Heisenberg equations of motion,
X˙(t) = i[h,X(t)], [26, 30], for the annihilation operators of the full system:
1This kind of terms are needed to keep the Hamiltonian Hermitian.
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
p˙1(t) = −iω1p1(t) + iλ1
∫
RB1(q, t) dq + iλ˜1
∫
RB(q, t) dq − iµex12p2(t)− iµcoop12 p†2(t)+
−iµex13p3(t)− iµcoop13 p†3(t) +M1(t),
p˙2(t) = −iω2p2(t) + iλ2
∫
RB2(q, t) dq + iλ˜2
∫
RB(q, t) dq − iµex12p1(t) + iµcoop12 p†1(t)+
−iµex23p3(t)− iµcoop23 p†3(t) +M2(t),
p˙3(t) = −iω3p3(t) + iλ3
∫
RB3(q, t) dq + iλ˜3
∫
RB(q, t) dq − iµex13p1(t) + iµcoop13 p†1(t)+
−iµex23p2(t) + iµcoop23 p†2(t) +M3(t),
B˙j(q, t) = −iΩj(q)Bj(q, t) + iλjpj(t) + i Rj(t), j = 1, 2, 3,
B˙(q, t) = −iΩ(q)B(q, t) + i∑3j=1 λ˜jpj(t).
(2.6)
where we have introduced the following quantities:
M1(t) = i
∫
R
(
νp12B2(q, t) + ν
p
13B3(q, t)− νap12B†2(q, t)− νap13B†3(q, t)
)
dq
M2(t) = i
∫
R
(
νp21B1(q, t) + ν
p
23B3(q, t)− νap21B†1(q, t)− νap23B†3(q, t)
)
dq
M3(t) = i
∫
R
(
νp31B1(q, t) + ν
p
32B2(q, t)− νap31B†1(q, t)− νap32B†2(q, t)
)
dq
R1(t) = ν
p
21p2(t) + ν
ap
21 p
†
2(t) + ν
p
31p3(t) + ν
ap
31 p
†
3(t)
R2(t) = ν
p
12p1(t) + ν
ap
12 p
†
1(t) + ν
p
32p3(t) + ν
ap
32 p
†
3(t)
R3(t) = ν
p
13p1(t) + ν
ap
13 p
†
1(t) + ν
p
23p2(t) + ν
ap
23 p
†
2(t).
(2.7)
The system in (2.6) is linear in its dynamical variables, so that an analytic solution can be found. In fact,
see [8], we deduce
P (t) = eU tP (0) +
∫ t
0
eU (t−t1) η(t1) dt1, (2.8)
where we have introduced the vectors
P (t) =

p1(t)
p2(t)
p3(t)
p†1(t)
p†2(t)
p†3(t)

, η(t) =

η1(t)
η2(t)
η3(t)
η†1(t)
η†2(t)
η†3(t)

,
and the matrix
U =

x1,1 x1,2 x1,3 y1,1 y1,2 y1,3
x1,2 x2,2 x2,3 y1,2 y2,2 y2,3
x1,3 x2,3 x3,3 y1,3 y2,3 y3,3
y1,1 y1,2 y1,3 x1,1 x1,2 x1,3
y1,2 y2,2 y2,3 x1,2 x2,2 x2,3
y1,3 y2,3 y3,3 x1,3 x2,3 x3,3

.
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Also, 
x1,1 = −iω1 − piΩ λ˜21 − piΩ1 λ21 − piΩ2
(
(νp12)
2 + (νap12 )
2
)− piΩ3 ((νp13)2 + (νap13 )2)
x1,2 = −iµex12 − piΩ λ˜1λ˜2 − piΩ1 λ1ν
p
21 − piΩ2 λ2ν
p
12 − piΩ3 (ν
p
13ν
p
23 + ν
ap
13 ν
ap
23 )
x1,3 = −iµex13 − piΩ λ˜1λ˜3 − piΩ1 λ1ν
p
31 − piΩ2 (ν
p
12ν
p
32 + ν
ap
12 ν
ap
32 )− piΩ3 λ3ν
p
13
x2,2 = −iω2 − piΩ λ˜22 − piΩ1
(
(νp21)
2 + (νap21 )
2
)− piΩ2 λ22 − piΩ3 ((νp23)2 + (νap23 )2)
x2,3 = −iµex23 − piΩ λ˜2λ˜3 − piΩ1 (ν
p
21ν
p
31 + ν
ap
21 ν
ap
31 )− piΩ2 λ2ν
p
32 − piΩ3 λ3ν
p
23
x3,3 = −iω3 − piΩ λ˜23 − piΩ1
(
(νp31)
2 + (νap31 )
2
)− piΩ2 ((νp32)2 + (νap32 )2)− piΩ3 λ23,
y1,1 = − 2piΩ2 ν
p
12ν
ap
12 − 2piΩ3 ν
p
13ν
ap
13
y1,2 = −iµcoop12 − piΩ1 λ1ν
ap
21 − piΩ2 λ2ν
ap
12 − piΩ3 (ν
p
13ν
ap
23 + ν
ap
13 ν
p
23)
y1,3 = −iµcoop13 − piΩ1 λ1ν
ap
31 − piΩ2 (ν
p
12ν
ap
32 + ν
ap
12 ν
p
32)− piΩ3λ3ν
ap
13
y2,2 = − 2piΩ1 ν
p
21ν
ap
21 − 2piΩ3 ν
p
23ν
ap
23
y2,3 = −iµcoop23 − piΩ1 (ν
p
21ν
ap
31 + ν
ap
21 ν
p
31)− piΩ2λ2ν
ap
32 − piΩ3λ3ν
ap
23
y3,3 = − 2piΩ1 ν
p
31ν
ap
31 − 2piΩ2 ν
p
32ν
ap
32 ,
and 
η1(t) = iλ˜1β(t) + iλ1β1(t) + iν
p
12β2(t) + iν
p
13β3(t)− iνap12β†2(t)− iνap13β†3(t)
η2(t) = iλ˜2β(t) + iλ2β2(t) + iν
p
21β1(t) + iν
p
23β3(t)− iνap21β†1(t)− iνap23β†3(t)
η3(t) = iλ˜3β(t) + iλ3β3(t) + iν
p
31β1(t) + iν
p
32β2(t)− iνap31β†1(t)− iνap32β†2(t).
In these last equations we have further introduced the operators
β(t) =
∫
R
B(q)e−iΩqtdq, βj(t) =
∫
R
Bj(q)e
−iΩjqtdq,
j = 1, 2, 3. Now, the time evolution of the number operators Pˆj(t) = p
†
j(t)pj(t), j = 1, 2, 3, can be found, and
the DFs are obtained as
Pj(t) :=
〈
Pˆj(t)
〉
=
〈
p†j(t)pj(t)
〉
, (2.9)
j = 1, 2, 3. Here 〈.〉 is a state over the full system. These states, [3], are taken to be suitable tensor products of
vector states on SP and states on the reservoir which obey some standard rules: for each operator of the form
XS ⊗ YR, XS being an operator of SP and YR an operator of the reservoir, i.e. any operator only refereeing to
the electors, we put
〈XS ⊗ YR〉 := 〈ϕn1,n2,n3 , XSϕn1,n2,n3〉 ωR(YR). (2.10)
Here ϕn1,n2,n3 is one of the vectors introduced at the beginning of this section
2, and each nj represents, as
discussed before, the tendency of Pj to form or not some coalition at t = 0. The state on R ωR(.) in (2.10)
satisfies the following standard properties, [3]:
ωR(11R) = 1, ωR(Bj(k)) = ωR(B
†
j (k)) = 0, ωR(B
†
j (k)Bl(q)) = Nj(k) δj,lδ(k − q), (2.11)
2More in general, we could be interested in considering a state 〈XS ⊗ YR〉 = 〈Ψ0, XSΨ0〉 ωR(YR), where Ψ0 has also been
introduced before.
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as well as
ωR(B(k)) = ωR(B†(k)) = 0, ωR(B†(k)B(q)) = N(k) δ(k − q), (2.12)
for some suitable functions Nj(k), N(k) which we take here to be constant in k: Nj(k) = Nj and N(k) = N .
Also, we assume that ωR(Bj(k)Bl(q)) = ωR(B(k)B(q)) = 0, for all j, l = 1, 2, 3, and for all k, q ∈ R. In
our framework, the state in (2.10) describes the fact that, at t = 0, Pj ’s attitude (concerning alliances) is nj
(Pj(0) = nj), while the overall feeling of the voters Rj is Nj , and that of the undecided ones is N . Of course,
taking Nj(k) and N(k) to be constant might appear an oversimplifying assumption, and in fact this is correct.
However, it still produces, in many concrete applications, a rather interesting dynamics for the model. This will
be evident in the rest of this section.
Let us now call Vt = e
Ut, which is simply the exponential of a six-by-six matrix, and let us call (Vt)j,l its
(j, l)-th matrix element. Then the DFs in (2.9) turn out to be the following functions:
Pj(t) = P
X
j (t) + P
Y
j (t), (2.13)
where
PXj (t) =
3∑
l=1
((Vt)3+j,l(Vt)j,3+l(1− nl) + (Vt)3+j,3+l(Vt)j,lnl) , (2.14)
and
PYj (t) = 2pi
3∑
k,l=1
∫
R
dt1[(Vt−t1)3+j,k(Vt−t1)j,lq
(1)
k,l + (Vt−t1)3+j,k(Vt−t1)j,3+lq
(2)
k,l+
+ (Vt−t1)3+j,3+k(Vt−t1)j,lq
(3)
k,l + (Vt−t1)3+j,3+k(Vt−t1)j,3+lq
(4)
k,l ], (2.15)
for j = 1, 2, 3. Here, to keep the notation simple, we have introduced the following quantities:
q
(1)
1,1 =
νp12ν
ap
12
Ω2
+
νp13ν
ap
13
Ω3
q
(1)
1,2 =
1
Ω1
λ1ν
ap
21 (1−N1) + 1Ω2λ2ν
ap
12N2 +
1
Ω3
(νp13ν
ap
23 (1−N3) + νap13 νp23N3)
q
(1)
1,3 =
1
Ω1
λ1ν
ap
31 (1−N1) + 1Ω2 (ν
p
12ν
ap
32 (1−N2) + νap12 νp32N2) + 1Ω3λ3ν
ap
13N3
q
(1)
2,1 =
1
Ω1
λ1ν
ap
21N1 +
1
Ω2
λ2ν
ap
12 (1−N2) + 1Ω3 (ν
p
13ν
ap
23N3 + ν
ap
13 ν
p
23(1−N3))
q
(1)
2,2 =
νp21ν
ap
21
Ω1
+
νp23ν
ap
23
Ω3
q
(1)
2,3 =
1
Ω1
(νp21ν
ap
31 (1−N1) + νap21 νp31N1) + 1Ω2λ2ν
ap
32 (1−N2) + 1Ω3λ3ν
ap
23N3
q
(1)
3,1 =
1
Ω1
λ1ν
ap
31N1 +
1
Ω2
(νp12ν
ap
32N2 + ν
ap
12 ν
p
32(1−N2)) + 1Ω3λ3ν
ap
13 (1−N3)
q
(1)
3,2 =
1
Ω1
(νp21ν
ap
31N1 + ν
ap
21 ν
p
31(1−N1)) + 1Ω2λ2ν
ap
32N2 +
1
Ω3
λ3ν
ap
23 (1−N3)
q
(1)
3,3 =
νp31ν
ap
31
Ω1
+
νp32ν
ap
32
Ω2
,
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and 
q
(2)
1,1 =
1
Ω λ˜
2
1(1−N) + 1Ω1λ21(1−N1) + 1Ω2
(
(νp12)
2(1−N2) + (νap12 )2N2
)
+
+ 1Ω3
(
(νp13)
2(1−N3) + (νap13 )2N3
)
q
(2)
1,2 = q
(2)
2,1 =
1
Ω λ˜1λ˜2(1−N) + 1Ω1λ1ν
p
21(1−N1) + 1Ω2λ2ν
p
12(1−N2)+
+ 1Ω3 (ν
p
13ν
p
23(1−N3) + νap13 νap23N3)
q
(2)
1,3 = q
(2)
3,1 =
1
Ω λ˜1λ˜3(1−N) + 1Ω1λ1ν
p
31(1−N1) + 1Ω2 (ν
p
12ν
p
32(1−N2) + νap12 νap32N2) +
+ 1Ω3λ3ν
p
13ν
p
23(1−N3)
q
(2)
2,2 =
1
Ω λ˜
2
2(1−N) + 1Ω1
(
(νp21)
2(1−N1) + (νap21 )2N1
)
+ 1Ω2λ
2
2(1−N2)+
+ 1Ω3
(
(νp23)
2(1−N3) + (νap23 )2N3
)
q
(2)
2,3 = q
(2)
3,2 =
1
Ω λ˜2λ˜3(1−N) + 1Ω1 (ν
p
21ν
p
31(1−N1) + νap21 νap31N1) + 1Ω2λ2ν
p
32(1−N2)+
+ 1Ω3λ3ν
p
13ν
p
23(1−N3)
q
(2)
3,3 =
1
Ω λ˜
2
3(1−N) + 1Ω1
(
(νp31)
2(1−N1) + (νap31 )2N1
)
+ 1Ω2
(
(νp32)
2(1−N2) + (νap32 )2N2
)
+
+ 1Ω3λ
2
3(1−N3).
As for the q
(3)
k,l , these can be deduced by q
(2)
k,l simply by replacing 1−N with N , N with 1−N , 1−Nj with
Nj and Nj with 1−Nj . Hence, for instance, we have
q
(3)
1,1 =
1
Ω
λ˜21N +
1
Ω1
λ21N1 +
1
Ω2
(
(νp12)
2N2 + (ν
ap
12 )
2(1−N2)
)
+
+
1
Ω3
(
(νp13)
2N3 + (ν
ap
13 )
2(1−N3)
)
,
and so on. Finally, for simple parity reasons we have q
(4)
k,l = q
(1)
l,k , for each k and l.
We see that PXj (t) in (2.13) contains all that refers to the parties, while the coefficients q
(n)
k,l entering in
the definition of PYj (t) refer just to the electors, since they are all defined in terms of quantities related to R.
Hence formula (2.13) clearly discriminate between the two. In principle we are now in a position to compute the
various DFs for any choice of the parameters and of the initial conditions for the parties and for the electors.
2.1 Playing with the model: the parameters νpkl and ν
ap
kl
We show now how the communication with the electors affects the choice of the parties regarding alliance. We
shall present some different scenarios in which we see how the interaction of one party with the electors of
another party can modify the final values of the DFs. More explicitly, we describe how the various DFs are
affected by the presence of non-zero νpkl and ν
ap
kl . The analysis presented extends significantly, and complete, the
one just sketched in [8], where only one particularly simple choice of the parameters was performed. Moreover,
the results in [5] can also be recovered simply taking all the νpkl and ν
ap
kl equal to zero, so that each Pj can only
interact with Rj and Rund, but not with Rk, k 6= j.
2.1.1 Scenario 1
In the first scenario we consider the situation described by the following initial condition and parameters:
n1 = n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N3 = 1, N2 = N = 0, µ
coop
12 = µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.3, µ
ex
12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.3,
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ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, λ1 = 0.05, λ2 = λ3 = 0.01, λ˜1 = λ˜2 = λ˜3 = 0.01, ν
ap
12 = 0.01, ν
p
12 6= 0,
and other parameters are set to 0. In this way, we are modeling an interaction between the parties which is
uniform and stronger than the interactions between the parties and the electors. With these parameters we
have carried out three different simulations3 with increasing values of νp12: 0.01, 0.1, 0.2. Because of this choice
of the parameters it is clear that the strongest interactions are those between the parties, while the interactions
between the parties and the electors are weaker. In fact µex,coopij ’s are larger than the λj ’s and the λ˜j . Also,
the interaction between P1 and R1 is stronger than the ones between P2 and R2 or between P3 and R3. And
so on. The fact that ω1 = ω2 = ω3 means that we are considering here parties with the same inertia, i.e. with
the same a-priori attitude to form or not an alliance. Of course, taking increasing values of νp12 allows us to
understand better the role of Hpmix.
The results are presented in Fig. 2, where it is evident that P1(t) decreases if we increase ν
p
12. As for P2(t),
which was equal to one at t = 0, it decreases to some asymptotic value which turns out to be slightly increasing
with νp12, see Fig. 2 (b). In Fig.2 (c) we see that P3(t) tends to a final asymptotic value which is weakly affected
by νp12. This is because P3 is not directly involved in the interaction between P1 and P2 proportional to νp12, so
that its change is just a sort of second order effect.
It is also interesting to stress that the asymptotic values of the DFs are not dependent on their initial
conditions (i.e. on what the parties want to do at t = 0), but only on the initial attitudes of the electors. In
fact, in Fig. 3 we show the time evolutions of the DFs with the (different) initial conditions n1 = n3, n2 = 0.3
and νp12 = 0.2, while other parameters are not changed. The selected initial conditions represent an initial
picture in which none of the parties is particularly inclined to form any alliance. One can see that the final
values of the DFs are exactly those already observed in Fig. 2 for the same value of νp12, ν
p
12 = 0.2, even if the
initial conditions for the parties are different. This phenomenon was already observed in [5], in a simpler version
of the system, and it is well described by the analytic forms of the DFs given there (see also (3.3) for a similar
formula with a peculiar choice of the parameters). This result shows the relevance of the interactions with the
electors, which is what really drives the parties toward their final decision, regardless of the initial interest of
the parties to ally. Then the parties are perfect, i.e. they really listen to their electors.
2.1.2 Scenario 2
In the second scenario, we consider the effects due to the variation of the parameter νap12 . We consider the same
initial conditions as in the first part of the previous scenario, we fix νp12 = 0.01 and we choose the following
increasing values for νap12 : 0.01 (already analyzed in the first scenario), 0.15 and 0.35. The results are presented
in Fig. 4. We observe that P1(t) tends asymptotically to a value which is closer and closer to 1 as ν
ap
12 increases.
Analogously to what we have seen in Section 2.1.1, we observe that the asymptotic value P2(∞) slightly increases
for higher νap12 , whereas P3(t) tends to an asymptotic value which is almost independent of ν
p
12, for the same
reason as before. In Fig. 5 we plot the time evolution of the DFs for initial conditions n1 = n3 = 0, n2 = 0.3,
different from those used in Fig. 4, and for νap12 = 0.35. The other parameters are the same as in Fig. 4. We
see that the asymptotic values are exactly those already deduced in Fig. 4 for the same value of νap12 = 0.35.
3It is clear that other choices of the parameters and of the initial conditions could be considered. In fact, we have considered
many of them. What is more relevant for us is to understand the role and the importance of each parameter in the description
of the system, and to check whether our interpretation is in agreement with what has been deduced for other systems, see [3] for
instance.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of the DFs for various values of νp12. The initial conditions are n1 = n2 = n3 = 1,
N1 = N3 = 1, N2 = N = 0. The choice of the other parameters is the following: µ
coop
12 = µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.3,
µex12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.3, ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, λ1 = 0.05, λ2 = λ3 = 0.01, λ˜1 = λ˜2 = λ˜3 =
0.01, νap12 = 0.01. The other parameters are set to 0.
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Figure 3: Time evolution of the DFs for the initial conditions n1 = 0, n2 = 0.3, n3 = 0 and other parameters as
in Fig. 2 with νp12 = 0.2.
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Figure 4: Time evolution of the DFs for various values of νap12 , and for ν
p
12 = 0.01. The initial conditions and
the other parameters are as in Fig. 2.
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Figure 5: Time evolution of the DFs for the initial conditions n1 = 0, n2 = 0.3, n3 = 0 and other parameters as
in Fig. 2, with νap12 = 0.35.
Again, the initial ideas of the parties are irrelevant for their final decision.
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2.1.3 Scenario 3
In this last scenario we analyze the effect of the simultaneous presence of two non-zero parameters in the
Hamiltonian measuring interactions of different nature. In particular we modify the parameters λ1, which tunes
the strength of the interaction between P1 and R1, and νp12, which measures the interaction between P1 and
R2. If we take both the parameters of the same order of magnitude, we expect that P1(t) will be influenced
by both N1 and N2. This could mimic the presence of some kind of fragmentation within the members of the
party P1, because a part of its members is more inclined to follow what suggested by their own electors, while
other members could be more inclined to follow the suggestion of the electors in R2. Obviously, this becomes
really interesting when N1 and N2 are sufficiently different, since otherwise this difference is not particularly
evident. When this happens, the obvious question would be: it is more convenient to listen to its own electors,
or to follow what other electors are suggesting?
To be concrete, we consider the following choice of initial conditions and parameters: n1 = n3 = 0, n2 = 0.3,
N1 = N3 = 1, N2 = N = 0, µ
coop
12 = µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.3, µ
ex
12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.1, ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 0.1,Ω1 =
Ω2 = Ω3 = 0.4, ,Ω = 0.05, λ2 = 0.01, λ3 = 0.3, λ˜1 = λ˜2 = λ˜3 = 0.01, ν
p
12 = 0.2, λ1 varies between 0.2 and 0.8,
and the other parameters are set to 0.
This choice of the parameters describes a strong interaction between P1 and bothR1 andR2 (due respectively
to the high values of to λ1 and ν
p
12), while P2 and P3 are only interacting with their own electors, but not with
the electors of the other parties. This choice is meant to put some asymmetry in the system. Due to the
contrasting initial conditions N1 = 1, N2 = 0, we expect that P1 experiences some kind of indecision when
λ1 = ν
p
12, while, for increasing λ1, the final decision of P1 should be more and more affected by the feeling of
R1. Due to the cooperative and competitive interactions (µex,coopij 6= 0), P2 and P3 interact with P1, and hence
we expect that also P2, P3 should be somewhat influenced by the variation of λ1. In particular, since the µ
coop
ij ’s
are greater than the µexij ’s, the parties have strong cooperation, hence it is expected that when increasing λ1,
the DFs P2(t) and P3(t) should stay closer to N1.
The results are shown in Fig. 6 for various values of λ1. When λ1 = ν
p
12 = 0.2, there is balance between the
two effects and P1(t) tends toward a value which is almost 0.513, very close the mean value of N1 and N2. If
we increase λ1 with respect to ν
p
12 this balance is lost, and P1(t) increases, meaning that P1 is more inclined to
follow what their electors R1 are suggesting. As expected, a weak change with λ1 is also observed in the plots
of P2(t) and P3(t).
Other simulations can be found in[5] and [8]. In particular, it might be worth to remind that, when the
parties only interact among themselves, the DFs have been found in [5] to oscillate reaching no asymptotic
value: it is only the interaction with the electors which produces a real decision!
3 Adding a rule ρ to the model
We introduce now an important variation of the model considered so far. This variation is based on the
introduction of some rules that somehow correct the Heisenberg dynamics. The application of rules in the
framework of physical systems described by quantum tools has been recently proposed in [10], where the notion
of (H, ρ)-induced dynamics has been introduced and applied to the description of the time evolution of a
population in a bounded 2D region and in the so-called quantum game of life. Some basic facts of this induced
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Figure 6: Time evolution of the DFs for various values of λ1. Initial conditions are n1 = 0, n2 = 0.3, n3 = 0,
N1 = N3 = 1, N2 = N = 0 and the parameters are µ
coop
12 = µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.3, µ
ex
12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.1,
ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 0.1,Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω3 = 0.4,Ω = 0.05, λ2 = 0.01, λ3 = 0.3, λ˜1 = λ˜2 = λ˜3 = 0.01, ν
p
12 = 0.2.
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dynamics can be found in the Appendix.
Here we suppose that at each time step τ , some kind of information reaches the electors, which can then
modify their opinions on whether their party should form an alliance or not. In other words, we suppose that
the values N1, N2 and N3 in (2.11), and possibly N in (2.12), can be modified at each time step τ because
of this information. Then, with these new values, the time evolution starts again for a second time interval of
length τ , when the rule is applied again. And so on. This is, in synthesis, our rule. We will make it more precise
and explicit later in this section. In particular, we set the initial conditions Pj,0(0) = nj,0 for the DFs, and the
initial condition (Nj,[0], N[0]) for the reservoirs
4, and we fix the time step τ such that in the time interval [0, τ ]
the time evolution of each DF Pj,0(t) is deduced, given the Hamiltonian (2.2), through (2.13). Notice that we
are now using two subscript indices (j, k) since the first is related to the party (j = 1, 2, 3) while the second
labels the number of the iteration (the first iteration is set to 0). At t = τ the values Pj,0(τ) are taken as input
for a set of rule ρ (specified later) which returns as output the new values (Nj,[1], N[1]), in general different
from (Nj,[0], N[0]), for the reservoirs (Rj ,Rund); this is because, at time τ , the electors may react in different
ways depending on whether they are satisfied or not with what the parties are doing. Then we start a new
iteration with the initial conditions Pj,1(0) = Pj,0(τ) for the DFs and with (Nj,[1], N[1]) for the reservoirs, and
the evolution of the DFs is again ruled by the Hamiltonian (2.2) in a second time interval of length τ . Then ρ
is applied a second time, and (Nj,[2], N[2]) are deduced. This process can be iterated N times so that, at the
end, we have obtained a sequence of DFs Pj,k(t), j = 1, 2, 3, k = 0 . . .N − 1, t ∈ [0, τ ]. Hence the global DFs,
in the time interval [0,N τ [, are reconstructed through
Pj(t) =
N−1∑
k=0
χk(t)Pj,k(t− kτ), j = 1, 2, 3, (3.1)
where χk(t) = 1 if t ∈ [kτ, (k + 1)τ [, and χk(t) = 0 otherwise. Notice that the DFs are continuous (but not
differentiable, in general) in time.
3.1 Making the rule
Of course, the key ingredient for the whole procedure described above is the concrete definition of the rule ρ. As
specified before, at each iteration, the rule works by taking as input the values (Pj,k(τ), Nj,[k], N[k]) and giving
as output (Nj,[k+1], N[k+1]). Needless to say, this procedure is not unique. We describe now the one we have
used in this paper, which is based on the following general ideas:
1. The values (Nj,[k], N[k]) are considered as a strength measuring how strongly the electors suggest the
parties to ally or not: if, for instance, N1,[k] ≈ 1, then the electors in R1 are strongly suggesting P1 to
form some alliance, while if, for instance, N1,[k] ≈ 0.6, then R1 is still suggesting P1 to ally, but in a
milder way.
2. If a party follows the suggestions of its electors (that is Pj,k ≈ 1 when Nj,[k] ≈ 1 or Pj,k ≈ 0 when
Nj,[k] ≈ 0), then we do not expect the electors to change much their behaviors after the rule is applied.
In other words, (Nj,[k+1], N[k+1]) should not be particularly different from (Nj,[k], N[k]).
4In this general introduction to the rule, we will consider the possibility that both Rj and Rund are modified by the rule.
However, in the concrete situation described by (3.2), Rund is not changed at all by ρ.
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3. On the other hand, when Pj is not doing what Rj is suggesting to do, Nj,[k+1] becomes very close to
one or zero (depending on whether Rj wants Pj to form or not an alliance), independently of the value
of Nj,[k]. Hence, in a single iteration, |Nj,[k+1] − Nj,[k]| could turn out to be close to one, which is the
maximum value allowed in our scheme.
4. The speed of change of the various DFs should be somehow related to the strength of the input coming
from the electors, i.e. to the values of the (Nj,[k], N[k]).
5. The undecided electors are not affected by what the parties are doing: they simply don’t care about the
parties! Then N[k+1] = N[k], for all k.
As already stated, other possible general ideas could be assumed, possibly as reasonable as those listed here.
For instance, we could also consider some effect of the rule on the undecided electors. But, at least in this
paper, we will work with this list.
Following these simple but realistic requirements, we define the rule ρ to determine Nj,[k+1] as follows:
Nj,[k+1] = ρ(Nj,[k], δj , Pj,k(τ)) =
{
Nj,[k] + (1− Pj,k(τ))s(1−Nj,[k]) (1−δj)(1+|δj |) , if Nj,[k] ≥ 0.5
Nj,[k] − (Pj,k(τ))sNj,[k] (1+δj)(1+|δj |) , if Nj,[k] < 0.5,
(3.2)
where δj = Pj,k(τ) − Pj,k(0), and s is a non negative parameter. First we observe that, using (3.2), the new
values Nj,[k+1] stay always in the range [0, 1]. Now, in order to better understand (3.2), and to show the relation
between (3.2) and the five general ideas listed above, we start noticing that the rule does not change the value
of N[k]. This is point 5 above.
Now, let us consider first what happens if Nj,[k] ≥ 0.5, i.e., if the electors in Rj are suggesting Pj to
form some alliance. Of course, the closer Nj,[k] is to one, the stronger this suggestion. If the party Pj is not
following what suggested by its electors, then δj < 0. This is because, in this case, the electors in Rj would
like Pj to ally (remember that Nj,[k] ≥ 0.5), while the DF of Pj is decreasing. Then (1 − δj)/(1 + |δj |) = 1
and Nj,[k+1] = Nj,[k] + (1 − Pj,k(τ))s(1 − Nj,[k]). Hence Nj,[k+1] is surely larger than Nj,[k], and the term
(1−Pj,k(τ))s tunes how rapidly Nj,[k+1] is increasing. The fact that Nj,[k+1] cannot be larger than one is due to
the presence of the factor (1−Nj,[k]), which ensures that, at most, Nj,[k+1] reaches the value one. This fulfills
the requirements of point 3 above. Otherwise, if Pj is following what its electors are suggesting, then δj > 0.
In this case (1− δj)/(1 + |δj |) ∈]0, 1[, so that Nj,[k+1] still increases with respect to Nj,[k], but with a rate which
also depends on the explicit value of δj . Similarly one could explain the rule in the case Nj,[k] < 0.5, where the
only (essential) difference is that now the electors are suggesting Pj not to ally at all.
Although the above rule seems sufficiently realistic, it is clear that other possibilities could also be considered.
For instance, another reasonable rule ρ˜, which will not be considered here, is the one which modifies, at each
step τ , the parameters of the hamiltonian h in (2.2) according to some external factors, like, for instance, some
opinion polls.
3.2 Concrete applications of the rule
In this section we consider some applications of the rule in (3.2). In all cases discussed here the parameter s is
fixed to be 14 . The time τ is taken to be 25, and we consider just four iterations.
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3.2.1
The first application is related to a simple case, in which the various parties interact only with their electors,
but not with the other parties and with the other electors. This case, in absence of any rule, was considered
in [5], and corresponds to the following choice of the parameters µexk,l = µ
coop
k,l = λ˜k = ν
p
k,l = ν
ap
k,l = 0, for all k
and l. It is easy to check that in this case the matrix U is diagonal, and the DFs, at each iteration, have the
following simple expression:
Pj,k(t) = Pj,k(0)e
−2pitλ2j/Ωj +Nj,[k]
(
1− e−2pitλ2j/Ωj
)
. (3.3)
Of course, this equation implies that Pj,k(t) would tend asymptotically (i.e., for t diverging
5) to Nj,[k] with a
convergence speed which depends on the value of λ2j/Ωj .
The DFs deduced after the four iterations, (3.1), are shown in Fig. 7, where we have taken the initial
conditions as follows: n1,0 = 0.2, n2,0 = 0.8, n3,0 = 0.5, N1,[0] = 0.1, N2,[0] = 0.6, N3,[0] = 1, N[0] = 1 and we
have considered the following choice of the other parameters: ω1 = ω2 = 0.1, ω3 = 0.2,Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω3 = Ω =
0.1, λ1 = 0.08, λ2 = λ3 = 0.02. This means that, at t = 0, P1 is not inclined to ally (n1,0 = 0.2), and that
its electors, those in R1, do not want P1 to form any alliance (N1,[0] = 0.1). Actually, in absence of any rule,
formula (3.3) predicts that P1,0(t) tends to 0.1 when t→∞. However, applying the rule (3.2) at t = τ , we find
a new value N1,[1], which is 0.0181, quite below the previous value N1,[0] = 0.1. This means that the electors
R1 are now suggesting P1 not to ally in a even stronger way than before. At the end of the second iteration,
at t = 50, P1(50) = P1,1(25) = 0.018, and by applying the rule we obtain N1,[2] = 0.00275, still quite below
than the previous value N1,[1]. By continuing this procedure, at the end of the fourth iteration, the asymptotic
value of the DF for P1 is P1(100) = 0.0000835. It is natural to imagine that, continuing to apply the rule for
more and more iterations, we would indeed find P1(t) → 0 as t → ∞: we see that P1 is doing what R1 was
suggesting!
Concerning the party P2, the initial condition N2,[0] = 0.6 means that the electors in R2 are (gently)
suggesting P2 to ally with some other party. However, as deduced by the formula in (3.3), the DF P2,0(t) tends
to N2,[0] = 0.6 for t large, which is a value below its initial value, P2,0(0) = 0.8. In fact, already for t = 25, we
obtain P2,0(25) = 0.7, which is smaller than the initial value 0.8. This means that the party is partially going
against what their electors R2 are suggesting: P2 is decreasing its original tendency to form an alliance, even if
R2 is (gently) suggesting to do that. However, applying the rule at t = τ , we get a new value for N2,[1] which is
1, much larger than N2,[0]. This shows that the electors are reacting in a bad way against their party, because
P2 is not listening to them. In the successive iterations the new values of N2,[k] remains equal to 1, and the
function P2(t) continues to increase. This is clearly shown in Fig. 7.
Finally, regarding the party P3, there is not much to say: in fact their electors R3 are suggesting to ally
because N3,[0] = 1. Hence the DF P3(t) can only increase in time toward the asymptotic value 1 and this is, in
fact, what is observed in Fig. 7.
3.2.2
In this second application we add the effect of the communication between the parties and the other parties’
electors, so that the parameters λj , λ˜j , ν
p
kl, ν
ap
kl can be different from 0. In particular we put λ1 = 0.08, λ2 =
5But recall that here t ≤ τ , and τ = 25!
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Figure 7: Initial conditions are: n1,0 = 0.2, n2,0 = 0.8, n3,0 = 0.5, N1,[0] = 0.1, N2,[0] = 0.6, N3,[0] = 1, N[0] = 1.
The choice of the parameters is the following: ω1 = ω2 = 0.1, ω3 = 0.2,Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, λ1 =
0.08, λ2 = λ3 = 0.02. The other parameters are set to 0.
λ3 = 0.02, λ˜1 = 0.01 and ν
p
12 = ν
ap
12 = ν
ap
13 = 0.001. The other parameters and the initial conditions are fixed as
in Subsection 3.2.1.
It is evident that with the choice of these parameters the party P1 has the strongest interactions with their
own electors, hence we expect that P1 should decide following essentially what its electors in R1 are suggesting,
that is no alliance at all. However, the choice νp12, ν
ap
12 , ν
p
13 6= 0 implies that P1 is also (but less!) influenced
by the electors in R2 and R3. The results are shown in Fig. 8. Although the various N1,[k] tend to zero
(N1,[1] = 0.0053, N1,[2] = 0.0008, N1,[3] = 6 · 10−6), the DF of P1 seems to stabilize around the value 0.085. This
expresses the fact that, regardless the attitude of the electors R1, the party P1 can slightly modify its attitude
taking into account also what R2 and R3 are suggesting. In other words, in this case the decision is not as
sharp as in absence of the (mixed) interactions between P1 and R2 and R3.
Conversely, the electors R2 and R3 suggest P2 and P3 to ally (even if with different strengths), since we
have N2,[0] = 0.6 and N3,[0] = 1. Applying the rule, at the various iterations we obtain N2,[k] = N3,[k] = 1,
k = 1, 2, 3, and the DFs P2(t) and P3(t) increase to about 0.8, showing in this way a certain attitude of both
these parties to form alliances.
3.2.3
The third application proposed simulates a condition in which all the parties are listening, but not in the
same way, to what all the electors are suggesting. Hence all the parameters are chosen different from 0,
with the exception of the νapk,l, which are all taken to be 0. The initial conditions for this configuration are
n1,0 = 0.5, n2,0 = 0.5, n3,0 = 0.5, N1,[0] = 0.4, N2,[0] = 0.6, N3,[0] = 0.6, N[0] = 0.5, and the other parameters
are ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 0.01,Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, λ1 = λ3 = 0.001, λ2 = 0.02, λ˜1 = λ˜2 = 0.01, λ˜3 = 0.02,
and νpk,l = 0.1 for all k, l. This choice describes the fact that the parties P1,P3 are more influenced by the
suggestion of the electors of the other parties rather than by their own electors, and this is the reason why the
related νpk,l are larger than λ1, λ3. Hence, we expect that the role of the electors R1,R3 is not so relevant, while
the electors Rund,R2 should play an essential role in the time evolution of the DFs.
These DFs are shown in Fig. 9, and the previous analysis is confirmed. The function P1(t) increases in
time, although the electors R1 suggest not to ally (all the N1,[k] are 0 after the application of the rule at
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Figure 8: Initial conditions are: n1,0 = 0.2, n2,0 = 0.8, n3,0 = 0.5, N1,[0] = 0.1, N2,[0] = 0.6, N3,[0] = 1, N[0] = 1.
The choice of the parameters is the following: λ1 = 0.08, λ2 = λ3 = 0.02, λ˜1 = 0.01 and ν
p
12 = ν
ap
12 = ν
ap
13 = 0.001.
The other parameters are set to 0.
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Figure 9: Initial conditions are: n1,0 = 0.5, n2,0 = 0.5, n3,0 = 0.5, N1,[0] = 0.4, N2,[0] = 0.6, N3,[0] = 0.6, N[0] =
0.5. The choice of the parameters is the following: ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 0.01,Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, λ1 = λ3 =
0.001, λ2 = 0.02, λ˜1 = λ˜2 = 0.01, λ˜3 = 0.02, and ν
p
k,l = 0.1 for all k, l. Other parameters are set to 0.
each iteration). A similar behavior is observed for the party P2, but in this case the choice of the parameters
λ2 = 0.02, which is bigger than the others, indicates that the party essentially follows R2. Regarding P3 we
can observe that its DF is only slightly increasing in time, and it does not differ too much from the value 0.5.
This is due to the choice λ˜3 = 0.02 that gives a significant role to the undecided electors Rund and to the fact
that the various N[k] remain fixed at 0.5.
4 The nonlinear model
In this section we propose a somehow different model, without any rule and in which the parties do not interact
with their electors, but only among themselves. Hence, we neglect the effect of the reservoir in the Hamiltonian
in (2.2). On the other hand, we include some cubic and quartic interactions in the Hamiltonian, and we explore
their consequences in the dynamics of the system. We can imagine that we are far away from elections, so that
the parties are not particularly interested in what the electors have to say. For this reason, all the terms in h
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involving interactions between the parties and the electors are neglected, and in fact the related parameters in
h are taken to be zero. In [5] it was shown that, in presence of purely quadratic interactions, the DFs oscillates
very much and no asymptotic limit (i.e., no final decision) can be reached. Here we will see that the DFs still
oscillate, but around certain asymptotic values which are very close to their initial values. This will be clear in
the following. In a previous work, [7], the effects of cubic interactions were included in the Hamiltonian of the
system, and the authors performed a perturbative analysis to recover an approximated solution. However, the
model was so complicated that, even the perturbative approach was not efficient enough to produce any explicit
solution. This was due to the presence of the reservoirs, which made all the computation rather un-friendly.
Here, removing the reservoir, we are able to include different kind (cubic and quartic) of interactions in the
Hamiltonian, and still to deduce exact solutions for the DFs of the parties. Our new Hamiltonian Hˆ is the
following: 
Hˆ = H0 +Hint +Hnl,1 +Hnl,2,
H0 =
∑3
j=1 ωjp
†
jpj ,
Hint = µ
ex
12
(
p†1p2 + p
†
2p1
)
+ µcoop12
(
p†1p
†
2 + p2p1
)
+
µex13
(
p†1p3 + p
†
3p1
)
+ µcoop13
(
p†1p
†
3 + p3p1
)
+
µex23
(
p†2p3 + p
†
3p2
)
+ µcoop23
(
p†2p
†
3 + p3p2
)
,
Hnl,1 = λ
a
12(p
†
1Pˆ2 + Pˆ2p1) + λ
a
13(p
†
1Pˆ3 + Pˆ3p1) + λ
a
23(p
†
2Pˆ3 + Pˆ3p2)+
λb12(p
†
2Pˆ1 + Pˆ1p2) + λ
b
13(p
†
3Pˆ1 + Pˆ1p3) + λ
b
23(p
†
3Pˆ2 + Pˆ2p3),
Hnl,2 = µ˜
ex
12Pˆ3
(
p†1p2 + p
†
2p1
)
+ µ˜coop12 Pˆ3
(
p†1p
†
2 + p2p1
)
+
µ˜ex13Pˆ2
(
p†1p3 + p
†
3p1
)
+ µ˜coop13 Pˆ2
(
p†1p
†
3 + p3p1
)
+
µ˜ex23Pˆ1
(
p†2p3 + p
†
3p2
)
+ µ˜coop23 Pˆ1
(
p†2p
†
3 + p3p2
)
,
(4.1)
where ωj , λ
ab
ij , µ
ex
ij , µ˜
ex
ij and µ˜
coop
ij are real quantities, so that Hˆ = Hˆ
†.
The meaning of the terms H0 and Hint was already explained in Section 2. The presence of the terms
Hnl,1, Hnl,2 introduces some new interactions between the parties. For instance the term Pˆ3p
†
1p
†
2 describes the
fact that P1 and P2 becomes more and more interested to form alliances for higher values of the DF of P3.
Analogously, the term p†1Pˆ2 describes the fact that P1 gets more interested in alliances the higher the attitude
of P2 to ally is. And so on. We say that the interactions are nonlinear because the Heisenberg equations of
motion deduced out of Hˆ in (4.1) are nonlinear. The interesting aspect is that Hˆ describes situations in which
the three parties interact among them simultaneously, something which was not allowed by (2.2), where we
have only two-bodies interactions.
Because of these nonlinearities, it is technically convenient to work in the Schro¨dinger, rather than the
Heisenberg, picture, see [26, 30, 3]. In this situation, calling Ψ0 the vector describing the system at t = 0, the
decision function can be written as
Pj(t) = 〈Ψ(t), Pˆj(0)Ψ(t)〉, (4.2)
where Ψ(t) = e−iHˆtΨ0 is the time evolution of Ψ0. Suppose now, as in Section 2, that Ψ0 =
1∑
k,j,l=0
αjkl(0)ϕk,j,l,
then, since Ψ(t) = e−iHˆtΨ0 is the solution of the Schro¨dinger equation
i
∂Ψ(t)
∂t
= HˆΨ(t), (4.3)
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we get the following system of differential equations for the time-depending coefficients αk,j,l(t) of Ψ(t):
i
∂αk,j,l(t)
∂t
= i〈ϕk,j,l, ∂Ψ
∂t
〉 = 〈ϕk,j,l, HΨ(t)〉. (4.4)
The solution of this system returns the time evolution of the modes αk,j,l(t), and the mean values Pj(t) are
finally deduced as in (2.1)
P1(t) =
〈
Pˆ1(t)
〉
=
∑
j,l=0,1
|α1,j,l(t)|2
P2(t) =
〈
Pˆ2(t)
〉
=
∑
k,l=0,1
|αk,1,l(t)|2
P3(t) =
〈
Pˆ3(t)
〉
=
∑
k,j=0,1
|αk,j,1(t)|2. (4.5)
These formulas are used in the rest of this section to compute the DFs of the parties in some particular case,
in order to highlight the various effects induced by Hnl,1 and Hnl,2 to the time evolution of the DFs.
4.1 A first analytic analysis on the nonlinear term Hnl,1
4.1.1 Competitive interactions
In order to get a better comprehension of the terms in Hˆ, we first consider Hnl,2 = 0, and we assume that only
competitive interactions arise between the parties (i.e. µcoopkj = 0 for all k, l). Moreover, to simplify further the
situation, we suppose that only P1 and P2 interact. Hence, all the interaction parameters involving the possible
interactions of P3 with P1 and P2 are put to zero. We also consider H0 = 0 here, since its role in the dynamics
of a system is nowadays well understood, [3], and it is related to the inertia of the various compartments of
the model. In this way, we can reduce the number of free parameters used in the model. Summarizing, for the
moment only λa12 and µ
ex
12 are assumed to be different from zero.
The system of equations (4.4) can be written as
Υ˙(t) = −iBΥ(t), (4.6)
where
Υ(t) =

α0,0,0(t)
α1,0,0(t)
α0,1,0(t)
α1,1,1(t)
α0,0,1(t)
α1,0,1(t)
α0,1,1(t)
α1,1,1(t)

, B =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 µex12 0 0 0 0 0
0 µex12 0 λ
a
12 0 0 0 0
0 0 λa12 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 µex12 0
0 0 0 0 0 µex12 0 λ
a
12
0 0 0 0 0 0 λa12 0

.
With this choice it is not difficult to find an analytic solution of (4.6), and the DFs, deduced as in (4.5),
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read as
P1(t) =
(|α1,0,0(0)|2 + |α1,0,1(0)|2)( (λa12)2 + (µex12)2 cos2(rt)
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2
)
+
(|α0,1,0(0)|2 + |α0,1,1(0)|2) sin2(rt) +
(|α1,1,0(0)|2 + |α1,1,1(0)|2)( (µex12)2 + (λa12)2 cos2(rt)
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2
)
+
(α1,0,0(0)α0,1,0(0) + α1,0,1(0)α0,1,1(0))
(
µex12λ
a
12 sin
2(rt)
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2
)
,
P2(t) =
(|α1,0,0(0)|2 + |α1,0,1(0)|2)(2(λa12µex12)2 + (1 + cos(rt))(µex12)4
((λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2)
2 sin
2(rt)
)
+
(|α0,1,0(0)|2 + |α0,1,1(0)|2)( (λa12)2 + (µex12)2 cos2(rt)
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2
)
+
(|α1,1,0(0)|2 + |α1,1,1(0)|2)( (λa12)4 + (µex12)4 + (λa12µex12)2(−1− 4 cos(rt) + cos(2rt)
((λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2)
2
)
+
(α1,0,0(0)α0,1,0(0) + α1,0,1(0)α0,1,1(0))
(
−4λa12µex12
(
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2 cos2(rt)
)
sin2(rt/2)
((λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2)
2
)
P3(t) = P3(0),
where r =
√
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2.
The first obvious remark is that P3(t) remains constant. This is expected, because of our choice of the
parameters which excludes any interaction between P3 and the rest of the system. It is also possible to see that,
if we increase the ratio λa12/µ
ex
12 , then, when t diverges, P2(t) tends toward the value(|α0,1,0(0)|2 + |α0,1,1(0)|2)+ (|α1,1,0(0)|2 + |α1,1,1(0)|2) ,
which coincides with P2(0). Moreover, also the amplitude of the oscillations of P2(t) depends on the same ratio
λa12/µ
ex
12 . The existence of an asymptotic limit for P1(t) is not granted, in general, since it depends on the
specific initial conditions.
If we now fix, in particular, α1,0,0 = 1, whereas the other αk,j,l are all zero, then
P1(t) =
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2 cos2(rt)
(λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2
,
P2(t) = 2
(λa12µ
ex
12)
2 + (1 + cos(rt))(µex12)
4
((λa12)
2 + (µex12)
2)
2 sin
2(rt).
Hence both P1 and P2 oscillate with amplitudes that decrease if we increase the rate λ
a
12/µ
ex
12 . In particular as
λa12/µ
ex
12 →∞ then P1(t)→ P1(0) = 1, P2(t)→ P2(0) = 0 for diverging t, so that both P1(t) and P2(t) tend to
their initial value. This suggests that, adding the term λakjPˆj
(
p†k + pk
)
in the Hamiltonian, forces the DF of
Pj to stay close to its initial value, at least for sufficiently large values of λakj/µexkj . In a certain sense, this term
behaves as an extended inertial term, even if it is completely different from the inertia coming from H0, see [3].
It is now clear why we have taken H0 = 0 in the present discussion: this was useful to avoid overlapping effects,
which could have hidden this result.
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4.1.2 Cooperative interaction
No particular difference arises if we now suppose that P1 and P2 have a cooperative attitude (i.e. µcoop12 6= 0).
As before all the parameters regarding the interactions of the party P3 with P1 and P2 are put equal to zero,
and we further fix ω1 = ω2 = 0. Moreover we now take µ
ex
12 = 0. Hence λ
a
12 and µ
coop
12 are the only parameters
different from zero.
In this case the matrix B in (4.6) is
B =

0 0 0 µcoop12 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 λa12 0 0 0 0
µcoop12 0 λ
a
12 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 µcoop12
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 λa12
0 0 0 0 µcoop12 0 λ
a
12 0

.
As before, it is not difficult to find an exact solution of the system in (4.6). However, we just consider here
what happens if we take α1,1,0 = 1, with all the other αk,j,l equal to zero. Then, putting r˜ =
√
(λa12)
2 + (µcoop12 )
2,
we find
P1(t) = cos
2(r˜t),
P2(t) =
(λa12)
2 + (µcoop12 )
2 cos2(r˜t)
(λa12)
2 + (µcoop12 )
2
,
while P3(t) = P3(0) for all t. Hence P1 oscillates between 0 and 1, and P2 oscillates between 1 and
(λa12)
2
(λa12)
2+(µcoop12 )
2 .
If we increase λa12/µ
coop
12 →∞, then P2(t)→ P0(t) = 1. This is the same effect observed in Section 4.1.1.
Also different choices of the initial status of the system suggest that, as in Section 4.1.1, P2(t) is confided
to oscillate close to its initial value, with an amplitude of the oscillations decreasing when the ratio λa12/µ
coop
12
increases. This confirms our previous claim that the term λakjPˆj
(
p†k + pk
)
in the Hamiltonian behaves as a
generalized inertia for Pj , since its effect for Pj(t) is to produce oscillations of the DF for Pj around the initial
value Pj(0), with an amplitude which can be controlled.
4.2 An analysis on the nonlinear term Hnl,2
We begin this analysis by first taking H0 = Hnl,1 = 0 in (4.1). Moreover, we suppose that P3 can have
competitive interactions with P1 and P2 (i.e. µex13 and µex23 are non zero), while P1 and P2 interact only if P3 is
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willing to ally (i.e µ˜ex12 6= 0, µ˜coop12 6= 0). In this case, taking also µex13 = µex23 , the matrix B in (4.6) is
B =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 µex13 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 µex13 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 µex13 −µex13 0
0 µex13 µ
ex
13 0 0 0 0 µ˜
coop
12
0 0 0 µex13 0 0 µ˜
ex
12 0
0 0 0 −µex13 0 µ˜ex12 0 0
0 0 0 0 µ˜coop12 0 0 0

.
If we take the initial condition α1,1,0 = 1 and the other αk,j,l = 0, only the first two parties want initially to
ally. By putting r1 =
√
8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2, the DFs obtained are
P1(t) = P2(t) =
1
8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2
[
6(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2 + 2(µex13)
2 cos(r1t))
]
,
P3(t) =
4 (1− cos(r1t)) (µex12)2
8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2
.
Notice that in this case the DFs do not depend on the parameter µ˜coop12 . It is clear that if we increase the
ratio µ˜ex12/µ
ex
13 then P1(t), P2(t) → 1, while P3(t) → 0. Hence, the DFs of the parties do no change too much
from their initial values.
This situation does not change if we consider as initial condition α1,0,0 = 1, and the other αk,j,l = 0
6. In
this case, calling r2 =
√
2(µex13)
2 + (µ˜coop12 )
2, we obtain
P1(t) =
1
(2(µex13)
2 + (µ˜coop12 )
2)
4
[
(µ˜coop12 )
8 + 7(µ˜coop12 )
6(µex13)
8 + 21(µ˜coop12 )
4(µex1 3)
4 + 16(µ˜coop12 )
2(µex13)
6 + 4(µcoop12 )
8+
cos(r2t)
(
8(µex13)
8 − 14(µex13)4(µ˜coop12 )6 − 2(µex13)2(µ˜coop12 )6
)
+
cos2(r2t)
(
4(µ˜coop12 )
2(µex13)
4 + 8(µex13)
4(µ˜coop12 )
4 + (µex13)
4(µ˜coop12 )
6
)]
,
P2(t) =
1
(2(µex13)
2 + (µ˜coop12 )
2)
4
[
4(µex13)
8 + 12(µex13)
6(µ˜coop12 )
2 + 17(µex13)
4(µ˜coop12 )
4 + 2(µex12)
2(µ˜coop12 )
6+
−2 cos(r2t)
(
4(µex13)
8 + 8(µex13)
6(µ˜coop12 )
2 + 9(µex13)
4(µ˜coop12 )
4 + (µex13)
2(µ˜coop12 )
6
)
+
cos2(r2t)
(
4(µ˜coop12 )
2(µex13)
4 + 8(µex13)
4(µ˜coop12 )
4 + (µex13)
4(µ˜coop12 )
6
)]
,
P3(t) =
2(µex13)
2 sin2(r2t)
(
(µex13)
2 + (µ˜coop12 )
2 + (µex13)
2 cos(r2t)
)
(2(µex13)
2 + (µ˜coop12 )
2)
2
The DFs do not depend on the parameter µ˜ex12 . If we increase the rate µ˜
coop
12 /µ
ex
13 then P1(t) → 1, and
P2(t), P3(t)→ 0 and again, the DFs of the parties do not change very much from their initial value.
A somehow different situation arises if we take the initial condition α1,0,1 = 1 and the other αk,j,l = 0. In
6Incidentally, let us notice that taking instead α0,1,0 = 1 will produce the same solution but P1 and P2 are switched.
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this case we get
P1(t) =
1
2 (8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2)
[(
12(µex13)
2 + 2(µ˜ex12)
2 + 4(µex14)
2 cos (r1t) +(
8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2 − µ˜ex12r1
)
cos (t(−3(µ˜ex12 + r1)/2) +(
8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2 + µ˜ex12r1
)
cos (t(3(µ˜ex12 + r1)/2)
]
,
P2(t) =
1
2 (8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2)
[(
20(µex13)
2 + 2(µ˜ex12)
2 − 4(µex13)2 cos (r1t) +
− (8(µex13)2 + (µ˜ex12)2 − µ˜ex12r1) cos (t(−3(µ˜ex12 + r1)/2) +
− (8(µex13)2 + (µ˜ex12)2 + µ˜ex12r1)) cos (t(3(µ˜ex12 + r1)/2)] ,
P3(t) =
1
(8(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2)
(
6(µex13)
2 + (µ˜ex12)
2 + 2(µex13)
2 cos (r1t)
)
We see that P1(t) and P2(t) both oscillate between 0 and 1, no matter the rate µ˜
ex
12/µ
ex
12 is large. On the
other hand if µ˜ex12/µ
ex
12 increases, then P3(t)→ 1, which means that only P3(t) stays close to its initial value.
Hence, adding the term Hnl,2 in the Hamiltonian leads to some dynamics already observed in the analysis of
the term Hnl,1: in fact, each term µ˜
ex
kl Pˆj
(
p†kpl + p
†
l pk
)
+ µ˜coopkl Pˆj
(
p†kp
†
l + plpk
)
has the effect to confine Pj(t)
close to its initial value if we increase the values µ˜exkl , µ˜
coop
kl with respect to the other parameters. However, while
Hnl,1 describes interactions between two parties, Hnl,2 describes simultaneous interactions between the three
parties.
4.2.1 More considerations for the nonlinear model
We end the analysis of this model by briefly discussing three more scenarios arising from the Hamiltonian (4.1).
In the first scenario we consider the case in which P1 does not want to ally. Moreover P1 is not inclined
to cooperate with the other parties, whereas it has an elevate competitive behavior. This means that we have
to take the parameters λb12, λ
b
13, µ˜
ex
12 , µ˜
coop
12 , µ
ex
12,13 quite large, while µ
coop
12 and µ
coop
13 are quite low. On the other
side, we assume that both P2 and P3 want to ally, and moreover they are inclined to cooperate, and they tend
to be not much competitive between them. Then we take µ˜ex23 , µ˜
coop
23 , µ
ex
23 low. The difference between P2 and
P3 relies in the fact that P2 is more static, so we have to take ω2 larger than ω37.
In Fig. 10 we show the time evolution of the DFs, with the initial conditions P1(0) = 0, P2(0) = 1, P3(0) = 1,
or, written adopting the notation used in system (4.6), α0,1,1 = 1 and other αk,j,l = 0. The parameters are
chosen as follows: ω1 = 0.3, ω2 = 0.5, ω3 = 0.1, µ
ex
12 = 0.01, µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.05, µ
coop
12 = 0.05, µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.2,
λa12 = 0.03, λ
a
13 = λ
a
23 = 0.1, λ
b
12 = 0.3, λ
b
13 = λ
b
23 = 0.1, µ˜
ex
12 = 0.03, µ˜
ex
13 = 0.02, µ˜
ex
23 = 0.3, µ˜
coop
12 = 0.03, µ˜
coop
13 =
0.02, µ˜coop23 = 0.3. The evolution shows that the attitude of P1 to ally is always quite low, while P2 and P3 are
more inclined to form alliances, with P2 even more inclined than P3. This is also due to the higher value of the
inertia of P2 compared to that of P3 (recall that ω2 > ω3), which contributes to make smaller the amplitude of
the oscillations of P2(t) with respect to those of P3(t).
In the second situation we consider the case in which P1 and P3 do not want to ally at t = 0, whereas
P2 is inclined to alliance. Hence α0,1,0 = 1, while the other αk,j,l are zero. We consider the following choice
of the parameters: ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = 0.02, ω3 = 0.1, µ
ex
12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.05, µ
coop
12 = µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.15,
λa12 = 0.03, λ
a
13 = λ
a
23 = 0.2, λ
b
12 = λ
b
13 = λ
b
23 = 0.2, µ˜
ex
12 = 0.2, µ˜
ex
13 = 0.02, µ˜
ex
23 = 0.5, µ˜
coop
12 = 0.2, µ˜
coop
13 =
7This incidentally shows that we are here considering H0 6= 0.
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Figure 10: Simulation of the nonlinear model. The initial conditions are α0,1,1 = 1, while the other αk,j,l = 0.
The parameters are: ω1 = 0.3, ω2 = 0.5, ω3 = 0.1, µ
ex
12 = 0.01, µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.05, µ
coop
12 = 0.05, µ
coop
13 =
µcoop23 = 0.2, λ
a
12 = 0.03, λ
a
13 = λ
a
23 = 0.1, λ
b
12 = 0.3, λ
b
13 = λ
b
23 = 0.1, µ˜
ex
12 = 0.03, µ˜
ex
13 = 0.02, µ˜
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23 = 0.3,
µ˜coop12 = 0.03, µ˜
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13 = 0.02, µ˜
coop
23 = 0.3.
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Figure 11: The initial conditions are: α0,1,0 = 1, while the other αk,j,l = 0. The parameters are: ω1 =
0.15, ω2 = 0.15, ω3 = 0.15, µ
ex
12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.05, µ
coop
12 = µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.05, λ
a
12 = 0.03, λ
a
13 = λ
a
23 = 0.2,
λb12 = λ
b
13 = λ
b
23 = 0.2, µ˜
ex
12 = 0.2, µ˜
ex
13 = 0.02, µ˜
ex
23 = 0.5, µ˜
coop
12 = 0.2, µ˜
coop
13 = 0.02, µ˜
coop
23 = 0.5.
0.02, µ˜coop23 = 0.5. This choice reflects the fact that, in particular, all the parties are quite competitive. Results
in Fig. 11 shows that P1(t) remains always quit low, while P2(t) and P3(t) have an higher variance.
Finally, we briefly sketch what happens changing the parameter λa12 which tunes the strength of the nonlinear
interaction given by the Hamiltonian term Hnl,1. We set the parameters as follows: ω1 = ω2 = 0.1, ω3 = 0.3,
µex12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.05, µ
coop
12 = 0.05, µ
coop
13 = µ
coop
23 = 0.05, λ
a
13 = λ
a
23 = 0.2, λ
b
12 = λ
b
13 = λ
b
23 = 0.1,
µ˜ex12 = µ˜
ex
13 = µ˜
ex
23 = 0.1, µ˜
coop
12 = µ˜
coop
13 = µ˜
coop
23 = 0.1. The parameter λ
a
12 varies between 0.5 and 2. Initial
conditions are chosen as P1(0) = 0.6, P2(0) = 0.3, P3(0) = 0 (or in terms of the αj,k,l, α1,0,0 =
√
0.6, α0,1,0 =√
0.3, α0,0,0 =
√
0.1). The results are shown in Fig. 12. As expected, if we increase λa12 then P2(t) oscillates close
to its initial value P2(0) = 0.3 with decreasing amplitude and increasing frequency. Conversely P1(t) experiences
high-frequency oscillations for increasing λa12: this was justified in the qualitative analysis performed in Section
4.1, where it was shown, for some particular initial conditions, that P1(t) can develop high-frequency oscillations
by increasing the rates λa12/µ
ex
12 and λ
a
12/µ
coop
12 . Regarding P3(t), we can notice that it also experiences rapid
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Figure 12: Time evolution of the DFs for various values of λa12. Initial conditions are P1(0) = 0.6, P2(0) =
0.3, P3(0) = 0. The other parameters are ω1 = ω2 = 0.1, ω3 = 0.3, µ
ex
12 = µ
ex
13 = µ
ex
23 = 0.05, µ
coop
12 = 0.05, µ
coop
13 =
µcoop23 = 0.05, λ
a
13 = λ
a
23 = 0.2, λ
b
12 = λ
b
13 = λ
b
23 = 0.1, µ˜
ex
12 = µ˜
ex
13 = µ˜
ex
23 = 0.1, µ˜
coop
12 = µ˜
coop
13 = µ˜
coop
23 = 0.1.
oscillations for higher λa12, although less marked than in the case of P1(t): this is because P3 interacts with P1,
so that the oscillations in P1(t) are somewhat reflected by the behavior of P3(t).
5 Conclusions and perspectives
In this paper we have proposed three different, but related, dynamical systems, all based on an operatorial
approach, describing a political system with three parties, interacting or not with a set of supporters of different
nature. In particular, the first model is based on an open system whose dynamics is driven (only) by a self-
adjoint Hamiltonian h. The second model is a variation of this first model, since the dynamics is driven by
the same h, but is also subjected to a certain rule implementing more relations between the supporters and
the parties, relations which cannot be expressed directly in an Hamiltonian language. The third model, which
can also be seen as a variation on the same theme, is based on the assumption that the interactions between
the parties, if these are not purely quadratic, become more relevant than the interactions between the parties
and the supporters, which can then be neglected, at a first approximation. We believe that all these models
have their own relevance, since they describe, with an unifying language, different, but related, situations. For
instance, the presence of the rule allow us to include in the general settings the presence of some information,
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while using the non linear model proposed in Section we can test the effects of different interactions between
the parties.
An interesting feature, evident when comparing the models considered in this paper, is that the nonlinearities
considered in Section 5 can be efficiently used to get a sort of (slightly oscillating) asymptotic value for each
DF, avoiding in this way the use of any reservoir, with or without any rule. From the point of view of the
interpretation, the model in Section 5 can be considered useful when the elections are still too distant so that
the parties do not care much about what the electors suggest. Also, this suggests that stronger (i.e., not purely
quadratic) interactions between the parties can be useful to help the parties to reach a (almost) stable decision.
However, we believe that the ones with the reservoir, and in particular the one with the rule proposed in
Section 3, is the most realistic within the models considered in this paper, since it takes into account several
reasonable effects which are observed in real life in many political systems. Also, in spite of its apparent
difficulty, the time evolution of each DF can be deduced analytically.
Of course our model can be improved in several ways. For instance, we could consider effects due to
different behaviors of different members of the parties, considering their specific communicative skills, their
tendencies to be corrupted (effects already taken into account in [16, 4]), and more effects. Another possible
interesting generalization consists in adding some random effect in the models, possibly adding some noise to
the parameters of the Hamiltonians (2.2) or (4.1). In our opinion this approach could be used to model some
irrational behavior of the electors. Moreover we guess our model can be extended to a more general framework,
including democratic hierarchical bottom-up voting (see the interesting works [17, 19, 11]), or the evolution
of the opinion in a closed group with respect to a choice between multiple options ([29]). All these possible
generalizations would probably improve the reliability of our models, which, however, already at the present
stage produce, we believe, a quite rich and interesting dynamics.
Appendix: Introducing the (H, ρ)-induced dynamics
In a recent paper, [10], the idea of (H, ρ)–induced dynamics was introduced, by putting together the general
framework of the quantum dynamics, described by a self-adjoint Hamiltonian H, and some periodic (or not)
effect which cannot be included in H. This appendix is devoted to give some essential information on this
dynamics.
Let S be our physical system and let Oj be a set of M commuting self-adjoint operators, needed for the
complete description of S, with eigenvectors ϕ(j)αn and eigenvalues α(j)n :
[Oj , Ok] = 0, Oj = O
†
j , Ojϕ
(j)
nj = α
(j)
nj ϕ
(j)
nj , (A.1)
j = 1, 2, . . . ,M , nj = 1, 2, 3, . . . , Nj , which can be finite or infinite. Let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nM ) and let
ϕn = ϕ
(1)
n1 ⊗ ϕ(2)n2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ϕ(M)nM .
Then ϕn is an eigenstate of all the operators Oj , i.e.,
Oj ϕn = α
(j)
nj ϕn. (A.2)
It is convenient and natural to assume that these vectors are mutually orthogonal and normalized:
〈ϕn, ϕm〉 = δn,m =
M∏
j=1
δnj ,mj . (A.3)
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The Hilbert space H where S is defined is (mathematically) constructed as the closure of the linear span of
all the vectors ϕn, which therefore turn out to form an orthonormal basis for H. Now, let H = H† be the
(time-independent) self-adjoint Hamiltonian of S. This means that, in absence of any other information, the
wave function Ψ(t) describing S at time t evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation iΨ˙(t) = HΨ(t), where
Ψ(0) = Ψ0 describes the initial status of S. The formal8 solution of the Schro¨dinger equation in t ∈ [0, τ [, for
a fixed τ > 0, is Ψ0(t) = exp(−iHt)Ψ0. Let now ρ be our rule, i.e., a set of conditions mapping, at a certain
time, any input vector Ψ0(τ) ∈ H in a new vector Ψ1 ∈ H, and with a synthetic notation we will simply write
Ψ1 = ρ(Ψ0(τ)). This is not very different from what happens in scattering theory, where an incoming state,
after the occurrence of the scattering, is transformed into an outgoing state. Then, in the new time interval
t ∈ [0, τ [, the new vector Ψ1 evolves according to the Schro¨dinger evolution, Ψ1(t) = exp(−iHt)Ψ1, and at time
τ we map Ψ1(τ) into a new state Ψ2. The procedure can continue for more iterations k = 1, 2, · · · . Let now X
be a generic operator on H, bounded or unbounded. In this last case, we will require that the various Ψk belong
to the domain of X(t) = exp(iHt)X exp(−iHt) for all t ∈ [0, τ ]. For instance in Section 3 we have considered
X as the number operators related to the various parties.
Definition 1 The sequence of functions
xk(t) := 〈Ψk, X(t)Ψk〉 , (A.4)
for t ∈ [0, τ ] and k ∈ N0, is called the (H, ρ)–induced dynamics of the operator X.
We refer to [10] for more details of the (H, ρ)–induced dynamics. Here we just observe that, using X(t) =
(x1(t), x2(t), x3(t), . . .), it is possible to define a function of time in the following way:
X˜(t) =

x1(t), t ∈ [0, τ [
x2(t− τ), t ∈ [τ, 2τ [
x3(t− 2τ), t ∈ [2τ, 3τ [
. . .
(A.5)
It is clear that X˜(t) may have discontinuities in kτ , for k ∈ N. In [10] we have discussed conditions for X˜(t) to
admit some asymptotic value or to be periodic, and some related notions of equilibria for a (H, ρ)-dynamics.
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